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Mitchell: In Quest of Speedy Justice

IN QUEST OF SPEEDY JUSTICE*
JOHN

N.

MITCHELL**

In the novel, Bleak House, Charles Dickens built his story and his message around a civil case before the High Court of Chancery that had dragged
on for generations. Two or three of the solicitors in the cause, he wrote, "have
inherited it from their fathers, who made a fortune by it ...."
Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable
young people have been married into it; innumerable old people have
died out of it.
This classic case of courtroom delay, as well as the whole theme of belabored justice that runs through Bleak House, come to mind again todaynot in England, whose courts are a model of swift justice, but in the United
States.
In our own country, delay in civil cases has long been notorious. But now
the infection has spread to criminal cases where "speedy trial" is guaranteed
in the sixth amendment to the Constitution. In our larger cities delays of
five to six months between arrest and trial are normal. Cases of delay up to
two years are not uncommon. It is not surprising that the New York jail riots
in the fall of 1970 were blamed largely on trial delays- more than forty per
cent of the inmates had waited at least a year to be tried.
In such desperate situations there is a great temptation to subordinate
the ends of justice to the urgent task of clearing the calendar. To keep cases
from coming to trial, negotiated pleas have become the order of the day.
One veteran defense counsel has said: "If every defendant refused to plead
and demanded a trial, within a year the system would collapse."'
Delay has also overtaken the trial period itself - the time in a federal
criminal proceeding has roughly doubled in the past decade.
But it is when we get to the post-trial stage that months can turn into
years. It is no problem to cite cases in which the post-trial review has dragged
on for a dozen years.
I submit that such a system of justice is in some respects a caricature of
justice. It denies the very blessing it is supposed to confer.
Little wonder that the American public is concerned about its system of
justice - while confidence in that system is indispensable to an ordered society.
Little wonder that, according to a recent poll, only twenty-three per cent
of the adult population think the American justice system is working well
today.
Little wonder that many have adopted a cynical distrust of the courts an attitude that cropped up as early as Shakespeare's time. In part II of
Henry VI a mob goes to London for the now-familiar purpose of trying to
*Address before the American Bar Association in London, England. July 16, 1971.
**Attorney General of the United States.
I. Mills, I Have Nothing To Do With Justice, LIFE, March 12, 1971, at 57, 68.
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stop the Government. You will recall the lines of Dick the butcher: "The first
thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."
I think you will agree with me that if this is the state of affairs today, it is
time something were done about it.
Recommendations have come from many sources. One approach to assure
speedy trials is simply to dismiss all criminal cases if they are not brought to
trial in a given period, and this has actually been adopted in some courts. It
has been proposed that a trial on a federal offense shall be commenced within
sixty days - excluding certain specified possible delays- and that otherwise
the case shall be dismissed with prejudice.
This, in my view, is what might be called a non-solution. The purpose
of the sixth amendment is, among other things, to assure a speedy trial - not
to withhold the processes of justice altogether. Under this approach, innocent
defendants are not vindicated and guilty defendants are not forced to recognize
their wrongdoing. And, of course, in the case of the guilty person who is set
free, the public pays the price in further crimes perpetrated both by the
uncorrected criminal and by others who are emboldened by his example.
It takes no prophet to foresee that such an arbitrary solution would
strengthen the defendant's hand in negotiating a guilty plea to an unreasonably lenient charge. In fact, under such circumstances the sudden rush of
defendants to claim their right to trial, far from unclogging the courts,
would overwhelm them.
Clearly, this solution attacks only the symptom of court delay, not the
causes. In an effort to satisfy the Constitution's sixth amendment, it runs
counter to the Constitution's very preamble - "to establish Justice." Carried
to its logical conclusion this approach would not only dismiss cases, it would
dismiss the function of the courts. It says to us that no justice is better than
slow justice. I will not say that this meat cleaver approach reflects the mind
of Dick the butcher, but it does provide a dassic example of throwing the
baby out with the bathwater.
Such a solution is even less defensible when we observe the speed of justice
in the British system, which is, after all, the source of the common law and
our entire legal tradition. It is my understanding that criminal cases in
Great Britain are generally brought to trial within sixty days of the defendant's
arrest. The trials themselves are usually disposed of within a few days, and
the most protracted trials are measured in days rather than in weeks or months.
In the infrequent cases where appeals are filed, final disposition is usually
made within three months.
I bring this up not to suggest that we adopt the British system as it is,
because many of the conditions and problems in the two countries are
different. For one thing, our system is complicated by separate state and
federal court jurisdictions. But I do suggest that we can learn from the British
system, and that its success in providing speedy justice shows that the task can
be achieved.
Another approach would provide bigger but not necessarily improved
courts -more judges, more courtrooms, bigger staffs. Some pr 41 (f these
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steps have already been tried in many cities, including Washifigton, and they
have generally been helpful.
But we have to recognize that these measures are a palliative, not a cure.
These are just more buckets to bail out the boat, rather than plugging the
hole.
There are also some other proposals that show promise of improving the
courts.
One is to bring new efficiency to the judiciary through the use of trained
administrators, computers to police the calendar and the cases, and the like.
Another is to reduce the volume of written language - the briefs, the
transcripts, the opinions - that accompanies the judicial process in the United
States, but not in Britain, and slows it through the mechanical needs of
typing, printing, and reproduction. More effort could be made to assure that
appeals will be heard within thirty to sixty days, thus reducing the need for
the printed briefs and transcripts that we now require. In fact, if appellate
decisions were this prompt, many of the appeals ordinarily made for delaying
purposes would never be brought in the first place.
Another proposal is to relieve the courts from hearing many types of
V cases, such as drunk arrests and other offenses that might be more appropriately dealt with by agencies outside the judicial process.
,/'
Still another is to reverse the tendency to take more and more of society's
problems to the courts and thus to burden them with still more duties. Too
often a quick solution is for the legislators to outlaw a particular practice and
provide for criminal prosecution, when in fact the judiciary may be less
equipped to handle the responsibility than an administrative agency.
Having enumerated these useful remedies, I have to say that if every one
of them were adopted throughout the American court system, we would still
have slow justice. I have cited them because I want to isolate the real subject
of my remarks - the Hydra of excess proceduralisms, archaic formalisms, pretrial motions, post-trial motions, appeals, postponements, continuances, collateral attacks, which can have the effect of dragging justice to death and
stealing the very life out of the law.
We face in the United States a situation where the discovery of guilt or
innocence as a function of the courts is in danger of drowning in a sea of
legalisms.
I refer to the overabundance of pretrial hearings designed mainly to
deprive the jury of material and relevant evidence.
I refer to meticulous requirements that can only be characterized as ritual
for its own sake.
I refer to the endless post-trial appeals so well described by the dean of
2
American district attorneys, Frank S. Hogan of New York:
Every conceivable aspect of the case, including things that were never
thought of at the trial, will be argued and reargued to panels of state
2. Address by Frank S. Hogan, District of Columbia Circuit Conference, in Washington,
D.C., May 27, 1970.
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and Federal appellate judges whose appetite for reexamination seems inexhaustible. Indeed, it is possible to say that there is virtually no such
thing as finality in a judgment of conviction.
Let me cite as an example a robbery case in which the suspect could only
be arrested if he could be identified by the victim. But it was impossible to
get the suspect in a lineup because there was yet no probable cause for his
arrest. With commendable ingenuity, the sergeant in the case summoned both
the suspect and the victim to the United State's Attorney's office at the same
time, without either of them knowing why. There were ten or twelve people
in the room when the victim arrived. He immediately recognized and made
known his identification of the accused. Yet the conviction of the defendant
was reversed by a higher court because a lawyer had not been present at the
identification!
We see in such examples the flowering of whole generations of legalisms,
one upon another, until a gulf of obscurity separates the law from the people.
Many defense attorneys will raise every conceivable argument, however frivolous and long-drawn, either out of pure litigiousness, or to protect themselves
against future charges of "ineffective assistance of counsel." And the courts
often let them go to such unreasonable lengths, with consequent delay, for
fear that the appellate courts will somehow find error, even in the most reasonable attempts to control excess litigiousness. I am reminded of the devastating
cartoons in which Daumier satirized the courtroom affectations of his day.
In dissenting against one reversal of the type I have described, Chief
Justice Warren Burger, then a member of an appellate court, had this to say: 3
I suggest that the kind of nit-picking appellate review exhibited by
reversal of this conviction may help explain why the public is losing
confidence in the administration of justice. I suggest also that if we continue on this course we may well come to be known as a society incapable of defending itself - the impotent society.
Nor is it enough that direct appeals can keep a case going through the
courts for years. A whole new Pandora's box of collateral attack has been
opened. Years after a conviction has been affirmed on appeal, every aspect of
a case is combed for possible charges of constitutional violation, which can
bring about a retrial and drag the case once again through the courts. There
is no limit to the number of collateral attacks permitted. Some prisoners have
filed as many as forty or fifty petitions. Each time a petition is granted, the
basic case is reopened in the original trial court. How can we expect the
prosecution to produce proof over and over again, while witnesses disappear
and memories falter?
Many of these petitions are brought in the very hope that the prosecution
will have lost key evidence. Besides frustrating justice, this growing practice
floods the courts with cases that were already tried. One district attorney has

3. United States v. Borum, 380 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J., dissenting).
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said: "Our old cases come back in a great wave, threatening to engulf the
gasping trial courts, already up to their chins in current business."
Worse, the competence of the lower courts is continually in question, with
the result that they are losing their authority and the public is losing its
confidence in them. In any other profession such inordinate backing and
filling, such technical challenges years after the bridge had been built or
the surgeon had operated, would be preposterous.
And the evil effect is not confined to the courts. What about the uncorrected prisoner who, as long as he believes he can be freed, will not acknowledge moral responsibility - the first step toward correction? When potential
criminals are encouraged because they know there is slight chance of conviction, much less imprisonment, when the convicted felon never reaches the
moment of truth and faces his own guilt, it is not just the courts that are
affected by our present plague of courtroom gamesmanship, it is the whole
criminal justice system.
With all this I do not advocate lessening the due process rights of the
accused. The spread of standard practices to assure these rights among all
courts has been a decided advancement in American justice.
I am speaking of the distortion of these practices for the purpose of
thwarting justice. And how far we have traveled along that road may be seen
by comparing the court conditions I have described with those here in Britain,
where justice is speedy, where the case backlog is manageable, and where
appeal is the exception rather than the rule. A capsule comparison of the
two criminal justice systems was made by Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls,
at a meeting of the California State Bar in 1969. Both systems dispense justice,
he declared, but there is an important difference. "When a serious offense is
committed we lock the defendant up and give him a speedy trial. You do
neither."
Certainly the American bench and bar can address the problem of speedy
justice and develop solutions that are suited to American conditions. This
Association has taken the lead with its Criminal Justice Project, whose reports
have been providing the states with proposed standards for criminal justice
procedures. Other bar associations, judicial councils, university law schools,
and state legislatures are studying aspects of the problem. As directed by
President Nixon, the Department of Justice is examining the reform of federal
criminal procedures.
Yet not enough work has been oriented toward the basic causes of delayed
justice that I have described. My plea is for the profession to intensify its
reforms in these conceptual areas - to revive the court's primary function as
a finder of fact, to restore finality as one of the attributes of justice, to breathe
life into the ancient adage, "Justice delayed is justice denied."
For its part, the bar needs to review some serious ethical questions. Every
attorney is, after all, an officer of the court, and is dutybound to preserve its
effectiveness. When, for example, he seeks unnecessary postponements in the
hope that witnesses will disappear, he is abandoning that duty. He is not free
to use every means at his disposal to defend his client, but only those means
within the law and the canons of ethics.
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And without going further into his obligations to the court and to society,
let me remind him of the obligation he owes his client. Too often the trial
attorney acts as though he is representing an issue rather than a client. To win
a point he may press it far beyond any benefit to his client. There are times
when his client is better served by negotiation than by pursuing a legal argument through the court system. No trial should be the vehicle for an issue at
the expense of the client's welfare.
In its turn, the bench is in the best position to halt the stampede of delaying tactics that is overrunning the name of justice itself. It can exercise more
judgment in identifying and resisting those devices designed to obstruct
rather than to promote justice. It can take affirmative action to speed the
process of justice by meeting with the parties before trial to clear away immaterial matters and prepare to focus on the real issues. It can consider devising a system to deal with all questions of fundamental fairness at the trial
and in normal review, as a substitute for the endless post-conviction collateral
review that so burdens our present system.
The judiciary can also examine the drift of American criminal justice
from a larger perspective. It can begin to recognize that society, too, has its
rights, including the right to expect that the courts will do justice, that the
innocent will be cleared, and the guilty will be corrected.
It can give as much attention to the constitutional right to a speedy trial
as it does to other constitutional rights.
It can recognize that perhaps it has been too preoccupied in the exhilarating adventure of making new law and new public policy from the bench, and
that this function of the courts has outdistanced the more sober task of
judging guilt and innocence.
The crowded calendars, the breakdown of speedy justice, the loss of
public confidence in the courts - these are the advanced symptoms of an ailment that has permeated our justice system. The ailment should have been
cured long before the patient reached the chronic stages of infirmity that I
described.
This is why I deeply believe that American administration of criminal
justice has reached a crossroads. Shall we continue on our present course
until slow justice becomes no justice? Until courtroom posturing becomes a
subject for the acid pen of a latter-day Daumier? Until it is said in our courts,
as it was said in the court Charles Dickens described: "Suffer any wrong that
can be done you, rather than come here"?
Or shall we alter our course, shunning the road to courtroom obfuscation,
and taking the road of courtroom common sense? Shall we resurrect the basic
role of justice - that of determining innocence or guilt? Shall we insist that
constitutional rights can be protected without immobilizing our courts with
unnecessary procedures and litigation?
The answer to these final questions must be a resounding "Yes," and the
time to begin action is now.
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